

Letters from Serbia - the 9th

EU is far away – and Kosovo is near

by László Végel

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The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations which states that the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 is not at odds with international law has caused a lot of bitterness in Serbia. After everything that was said in The Hague, demonstrating national unity the Serbian Parliament had immediately voted in a declaration that (it is expected) Serbian diplomats will submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a vote. On the day, and actually in the exact moment, that the advisory opinion was made public, from all orthodox Christian temples in the country bells could be heard ringing and the clergy and monks had called on all the faithful to a prayer for Serbian justice.

Following the decision the Serbian press represented this as being a cold shower, and rightfully so, because right before the International Court's opinion was made public both politicians and experts were equally overly optimistic. After all of that the President of the Republic, Boris Tadić, gave an official statement in which he said that in history unjust decisions take place, but that in spite of this Serbia will continue its decisive fight for Kosovo. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vuk Jeremić, warned that the Court had opened up a Pandora's Box and now a new menace will circle the globe: the menace of secessionism. The government held an emergency session and unanimously voted in a resolution which will be brought before the United Nations General Assembly.

A majority of the Serbian professional public voiced their criticism regarding the International Court's opinion. According to the opinion

Pisma iz Srbije, 9.

EU je daleko – a Kosovo blizu

od Lasla Vegela

Avgust 2010.

Savetodavno mišljenje Međunarodog suda pravde Organizacije ujedinjenih nacija, po kojem jednostrano proglašenje nezavisnosti Kosova 2008. godine nije u suprotnosti s međunarodnim pravom, izazvalo je veliko ogorčenje u Srbiji. Posle svega što je rečeno u Hagu, srpski parlament, demonstrirajući svenacionalno jedinstvo, odmah je izglasao deklaraciju koju će – kako se očekuje – srpska diplomatija podneti na usvajanje Generalnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija. Na dan – štaviše, u času – objavljivanja savetodavnog mišljenja, u svim pravoslavnim hramovima zemlje oglasila su se zvona, a sveštenstvo i monaštvo pozvalo je vernike na moleban za srpsku pravdu.

Nakon saopštenja odluke srpska štampa je pisala o hladnom tušu, i to s pravom, jer uoči objavljivanja mišljenja međunarodnog suda, i političari, i eksperti bili su podjednako preterano optimisti. Na kraju je predsednik Republike Boris Tadić, u formi zvanične izjave rekao da se u istoriji dešavaju nepravedne odluke, ali da će Srbija uprkos tome nastaviti s odlučnom borbom za Kosovo. Ministar za inostrane poslove Vuk Jeremić je upozorio da je sud otvorio Pandorinu kutiju, usled čega jedan novi bauk počinje da kruži svetom: bauk secesionizma. Vlada je održala vanrednu sednicu i jednoglasno donela rezoluciju koju će najesen proslediti Genralnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija.

I većina stručne javnosti u Srbiji se kritički oglasila o stavu haškog Međunarodnog suda pravde. Prema mišljenju Predraga Simića,



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of Predrag Simić, professor of international law at the Belgrade Faculty of Political Sciences, this was not a victory of justice but a victory for Washington and Brussels. Tibor Varadi, a international law expert, stated for the Belgrade daily Politika that the Court had not answered the question given to it and that it resorted to manipulation. Much like Jeremić, he also stressed that this decision will encourage secessionist movements. Following this context Politika's foreign correspondent from Romania reported in harsh tones about "Romania's Kosovo", i.e. Erdelj, and said that the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs gave a statement in which he talked about the "Hungarian threat". The correspondent also directly called Laslo Tókeš, a Hungarian politician from Erdelj, a secessionist. Constitutional law experts now have the opportunity to analyze the weak arguments of this opinion, or those that are more or less legally founded, and try to foresee its repercussions. However, one thing is certain: now the second stage of the Kosovo issue is over.

For the coalition which is lead by the Democratic Party the Court's decision is certainly a fiasco, since it deals a serious blow to their pre-election assurance that the tasks of joining the EU and keeping Kosovo within the boundaries of Serbia are equally important – and that they do not mutually annul each other. Now it seems that these two principles may also be in conflict. Serbia will have to make a decision. A major question is to what extent is it possible to postpone this decision, does it make any sense to do that and, furthermore, what kinds of hidden compromises could still take place. And these options were, however cautiously, implied not only by diplomats of very influential European countries but also by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Jeremić, when during his visit to Budapest he said: if the price for accession to the European Union is acknowledging Kosovo's independence, in that case Serbia will reject the European Union.

The International Court's decision has brought out into the light the political dilemma that has until now been repressed in the subconscious: either Kosovo or the European Union? The truth is that the Kosovo issue only somewhat influences the lessening of faith in the European option. Because the European Union has prolonged the process of admission for new members, it has damaged the credibility of pro-European forces. The European Union is far removed into the distant future, while Kosovo is so near. And precisely

profesora međunarodnog prava beogradskog Fakulteta političkih nauka, nije pobedila pravda, nego Brisel i Vašington. Tibor Varadi, ekspert za međunarodno pravo, u izjavi za beogradsku Politku je naglasio da sud nije odgovorio na postavljeno pitanje i da je pribegao manipulaciji. Slično Jeremiću, i on ističe da ovakvom odlukom sud podstiče secesionističke pokrete. U tom kontekstu, dopisnik Politike iz Rumunije oštrim tonom izveštava o „rumunskom Kosovu“, odnosno o Erdelju, prenoseći i izjavu rumunskog ministra za inostrane poslove u kojoj se ukazuje na „mađarsku opasnost“, dok je Lasla Tekeša, mađarskog političara iz Erdelja, bez uvijaja nazvao secesionistom. Stručnjaci za ustavno pravo mogu sad da analiziraju slabe, ili pravno manje ili više utemeljene argumente ovog savetodavnog mišljenja, i da pokušaju da predvide njegove reprekusije. Jedno je, međutim, izvesno: druga etapa kosovskog pitanja ovim je okončana.

Za koaliciju predvođenu Demokratskom strankom, ova odluka je svakako predstavljala fijasko, njome je naime ozbiljno uzdrmano predizborno obećanje po kojem su priključenje Evropskoj uniji i očuvanje Kosova unutar granica Srbije zadaci istog prioriteta, odnosno, da se međusobno ne isključuju. Sad se ispostavlja da se ova dva principa mogu naći i u sukobu. Srbija će morati da se opredeli. Veliko je pitanje koliko je moguće, odnosno da li uopšte i вреди odlagati odluku i, nadalje, kakavi su skriveni kompromisi još mogući. A tu opciju su nagovestile – mada veoma oprezno – ne samo diplomate uticajnih evropskih zemalja, nego i sam srpski ministar za inostrane poslove, Vuk Jeremić, kad je prilikom posete Budimpešti izjavio: ako je cena učlanjenja Srbije u Evropsku uniju priznanje nezavisnosti Kosova, u tom slučaju će se Srbija odreći Evropske unije.

Odluka Međunarodnog suda pravde je izbacila na površinu političku dilemu koja je sve do sada bila potiskivana u podsvesti: ili Kosovo, ili Evropska unija? Istina, Kosovo tek delimično utiče na slabljenje vere u evropsku opciju. Time što je Evropska unija prolongirala prijem novih članova, narušila je kredibilitet proevropskih snaga. Evropska unija se povukla u daleku budućnost, dok je Kosovo toliko blisko. Upravo je to doprinelo porastu evroskepticizma u Srbiji, kao i u čitavom regionu, uostalom. Sve više dolazi do izražaja

this has contributed to the rise of Euroscepticism in Serbia, and in the whole region for that matter. There is an ever-growing conviction that Serbia must build stronger ties with Russia. This conviction is reinforced by theories, which are becoming ever more popular, on the crises of Western style capitalism. On the back of this political tendency certain decisions have been made recently in the area of (political) economy, and due to these decisions the complete Serbian oil industry has found its way into Russian hands – which was wholeheartedly supported by all major political parties. The sirens' song of Putinesque capitalism, which is very nationalistic in character, is becoming increasingly loud and more appealing in Serbia, as in other countries in the region. When it comes to assessing the probabilities of Serbian accession to the European Union, it should be taken into consideration that a pro-Russian orientation has very deep roots in Serbian national history. It should however also be taken into consideration that Russia has nothing against Serbia joining the European Union, furthermore, this is even in its interest in a certain way, but it is strongly opposed to Serbia joining NATO. It is a major question whether Serbia can join the European Union without being a member of the NATO pact.

uverenje da Srbija mora izgrađivati čvršće veze s Rusijom. To uverenje podupiru i sve popularnije teorije o krizi kapitalizma zapadnog tipa. Na tragu ove političke tendencije su donete u poslednje vreme i neke odluke iz sfere (političke) ekonomije usled kojih se, na primer, čitava srpska naftna industrija našala u ruskim rukama, a što su sve veće političke stranke zdušno podržale. Sirenski pev putinovskog kapitalizma, naglašeno nacionalnog profila, sve je glasniji i zamamniji u Srbiji, kao i u drugim zemljama ovog regiona. Kad je reč o prosuđivanju izgleda priključenja Srbije Evropskoj uniji, treba računati i sa okolnošću da ruska orijentacija ima i te kako duboke tradicije u srpskoj nacionalnoj istoriji. U tom svetlu treba znati i to, da Rusija nema ništa protiv da se Srbija učlani u Evropsku uniju, štaviše, u izvesnom smislu to je i u njenom interesu, ali se vrlo odlučno protivi njenom ulasku u NATO. A veliko je pitanje, da li Srbija uopšte može da računa na članstvo u Evropskoj uniji, bez članstva u NATO-paktu.



Therefore, the questions are multiplying. Is there maybe still some small secret opening left for compromise? Before the opinion of the Hague Court was made public, many had hoped for some sort of ambiguous decision which would open the door to new negotiations and which would result in a historic compromise between the Serbs and the Albanians.

While we waited for the decision of the Court, Serbian politicians repeatedly rejected the idea of Kosovo's division while the Serbian press wrote precisely on that subject.

As a rule these articles contained reminders that the writer Dobrica Ćosić, the father of the Serbian national movement, had suggested this solution in 1992. Ćosić had participated in the fight against the fascists alongside Tito's partisans, and later became the favorite writer of the Party, he was Chief of Agitprop and, up to 1968, a member of the Central Committee where he – to his own misfortune – brought forth the issue of Serbian victimhood in Kosovo. The Central Committee distanced itself from his observations, and he subsequently decided to leave the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

It was from this moment actually that Dobrica Ćosić became a key figure of Serbian spiritual life.

At the Hague Tribunal for War Crimes, Slobodan Milošević called him the greatest living Serbian writer. Vojislav Koštunica had a high opinion of him as well. And in a telegram for the writer's 80th birthday, Zoran Djindjić referred to him a Serbian Thomas Man. Ćosić was also a role model for the current president Boris Tadić in his youth, and as he confessed, when important issues are at hand, he is still willing to listen to the literary bard's advice.

The Kosovo issue was taboo in Tito's time and after 1968 it became the central base idea of the opposition in Serbia, and two decades later on it affected the disintegration of Yugoslavia and determined the direction as well as the content of the Serbian political system.

It would be wrong however to fall into the trap of many "Balkanologists" and claim that full responsibility for the Kosovo conflict is on Milošević – mostly because this conflict far precedes him. The Serb-Albanian cold war has been lasting for a hundred years. There are some historians, not few of them, who believe that Serbia lost Kosovo when her troops reclaimed the "cradle of Serbia" from the Turks in 1912. The Serbian political elite experienced

Pitanja se, dakle, umnožavaju. Ostaju li makar neka skrivena mala vrata za kompromis? Pre objavljivanja mišljenja haškog suda mnogi su se nadali nekakvoj dvosmislenoj odluci koja bi otškrinula vrata novim pregovorima, a koji bi rezultirali istorijskim kompromisom Srba i Albanaca.

I dok su u periodu iščekivanja sudske odluke srpski političari dosledno odbijali ideju o podeli Kosova, srpska štampa je neprestano pisala baš o toj opciji.

Ti članci su po pravilu podsećali da je tu mogućnost još 1992. godine predložio književnik Dobrica Ćosić, otac srpskog nacionalnog pokreta. Ćosić je sa Titovim partizanima učestvovao u antifašističkoj borbi, pa je potom postao omiljeni pisac partije, bio je šef agitpropa i, sve do 1968. godine, član Centralnog komiteta kad je – na svoju nesreću – na tom forumu izneo stradanja kosovskih Srba. Centralni komitet se ogradio od njegovih opservacija, nakon čega je dobrovoljno napustio Savez komunista Jugoslavije.

Od tog trenutka, zapravo, Dobrica Ćosić je postao ključna figura srpskog duhovnog života.

Pred haškim tribunalom za ratne zločine Slobodan Milošević ga je nazvao najvećim živim srpskim piscem. I Vojislav Koštunica je imao visoko mišljenje o njemu. A Zoran Đinđić ga je, u pozdravnom telegramu povodom piščevog 80. rođendana, nazvao srpskim Tomasom Manom. Ćosić je bio mladalački uzor i aktuelnom predsedniku Republike, Borisu Tadiću i, po sopstvenom priznanju, kad su važne stvari u pitanju, i danas je spreman da sasluša savete književnog barda.

Pitanje Kosova je u Titovo vreme bilo tabuizovano, a posle 1968. godine ono je postalo temeljna središnja ideja srpske opozicije, a dve decenije kasnije uticalo je na raspad Jugoslavije i odredilo kako tokove, tako i sadržaj promene političkog sistema u Srbiji.

Ali bilo bi pogrešno ušetati se u klopku brojih „balkanologa“ i kosovski konflikt u celini staviti na Miloševićev račun, pre svega zbog toga što je taj konflikt bitno ranijeg datuma. Srpsko-albanski hladni rat traje, naime, bezmalo čitavo jedno stoleće. Ne mali broj istoričara sklon je mišljenju da je Srbija izgubila Kosovo kad su njene trupe 1912. godine povratile nekadašnju „kolevku srpstva“ od Turaka. Srpska politička elita preživela je tada multi-

a multi-cultural shock at this time since, due to the Albanians, it discovered a completely foreign world which was very different than the one they had remembered. The stress of this occurrence had shocked the Serbian elite to such an extent that the Serbian Parliament had voted in a law which stated that Kosovo

kulturalni šok, naime, u Albancima je naišla na jedan potpuno strani svet, sasvim različit od onog koji je čuvala u svom sećanju. Ovaj stres je do te mere uzdrmao srpsku elitu, da je srpski parlament izglasao zakon po čijem slovu kosovski Albanci nisu mogli da uživaju ona ustavna prava koja im ustav, inače, ge-



Albanians could not enjoy their constitutional rights (which they were generally entitled to under the Constitution) because those Albanians had allegedly not reached an adequate civilization level. Hence, the relations between the two nations have always been very tense, while only the tension level varied – and not even Tito's magic wand could discipline it. In Serbian society there is a deeply rooted idea that Kosovo Albanians subject Kosovo Serbs to genocide. While Tito was alive people did not speak publicly about this idea, and after his death the opposition – at first through those who were a soft opposition and then later on through those intellectuals who had positioned themselves in cultural and educational institutions - had begun to vocally demand that “energetic measures” be taken. In January of 1986, when Milošević had not yet taken full authority, 211 respected Serbian politicians had submitted a petition to both the Serbian and the Federal Parliament. Among the signatories there were not only intellectuals who had previously been labeled as nationalists by the Party, but also numerous academics, university professors – intellectuals who played a significant role in the 80's public life. Alongside them the signato-

neralno, garantuje, jer ti Albanci navodno još nisu dosegli odgovarajući nivo civilizovanosti. Odnosi između te dve nacije su, dakle, uvek bili vrlo napeti, varirao je samo intenzitet te napetosti, koju ni Titov čarobni štapić nije bio u stanju da disciplinuje. U srpskom društvu je duboko ukorenjena ideja da kosovski Albanci podvrgavaju tamošnje Srbe genocidu. Dok je Tito bio živ, s tom tezom se nije izlazilo u javnost, a posle njegove smrti opozicija je - u ulozi „poluopozicije”, a kasnije kroz onaj sloj intelektualaca koji se pozicionirao u kulturnim i obrazovnim institucijama sistema - sve glasnije zahtevala preduzimanje „energičnih mera”. U januaru 1986. godine, dakle, u vreme kad Milošević još nije prigrabio svu vlast, 211 uglednih srpskih intelektualaca uputilo je peticiju saveznom i srpskom parlamentu. Među potpisnicima nisu bili samo intelektualci koji su od strane partije već ranije bili obeleženi kao nacionalisti, nego i brojni akademici, univerzitetski profesori – intelektualci koji su u osamdesetim godinama igrali značajnu ulogu u javnom životu. I uz njih potpisnici su bili i demokrate od uverenja, zagovornici evropskih sistema vrednosti, među njima i Dragoljub Mićunović, prvi predsednik opozicione Demokratske stranke koji je posle pada Miloševića,

ries were democrats of conviction, advocates of the European value system, like Dragoljub Mićunović, first president of the opposition Democratic Party, who after the fall of Milošević had become President of the Parliament of (reduced) Yugoslavia; or university professor Zagorka Golubović; sociologist Nebojša Popov, the main editor of opposition magazine Republika – all of whom were profoundly critical of Milošević's politics. Of course, Vojislav Koštunica – Milošević's successor to the state presidency – also signed the petition which was formulated by Dobrica Ćosić and which spoke of Kosovo Serbs being victims of genocide. Serbia had capitulated in Kosovo without officially signing a capitulation. If, however, influential intellectuals of various political orientations were unanimous in thinking that genocide was committed against Serbs already in the 80's, then it is clear that regarding the Kosovo issue Milošević was more of a catalyst – which does not lessen his responsibility any but places the dimensions of the Kosovo issue today in a realistic framework.

Twenty years later on Serbian politics had made official the ideas of Dobrica Ćosić and numerous opposition intellectuals. Official politics and the opposition interweaved. Ćosić had welcomed Slobodan Milošević, whom he compared to Nikola Pašić – the greatest Serbian politician of the 20th century. The famous writer became president of the Republic in 1992 due to the backing of Milošević's party, and so the Ćosić-Panić government was formed but soon it confronted Milošević's hawks since Milošević was the embodiment of anti-democratic nationalism while Ćosić considered himself a supporter of democratic nationalism.

Consequently the Parliament had a vote of "no confidence" in Ćosić and from then on the famous writer went on frequent opposition meetings. Since he was ahead of his time in 1986 in regards to the Kosovo issue, and brought into public consciousness a nationalistic perception of Kosovo, so again in 1993 in conflict with Milošević and in opposition to the ruling political elite, he realized that with Milošević Serbian nationalism was headed for disaster.

After the conflict with Milošević he became an ever more vocal proponent of the division of Kosovo, but Serbian politicians and the Serbian public rigidly rejected this idea. On the 21st of January 1992 Ćosić told the US ambassador, Zimmermann, in detail that his stance is that Kosovo should be divided and that Serbs would be satisfied with a third of

postao predsednik parlamenta redukovane Jugoslavije, ili univerzitetska profesorka Zagorka Golubović, pa sociolog Nebojša Popov, glavni urednik opozicione Republike – svi od reda radikalni kritičari miloševićevske politike. Naravno, i Vojislav Koštunica, Miloševićev naslednik na poziciji predsednika zemlje, takođe je potpisao peticiju čiji je tekst formulisao Dobrica Ćosić, a koji govori o tome da su kosovski Srbi žrtve genocida. Srbija je na Kosovu kapitulirala, bez da je zavnično i potpisala kapitulaciju. Ako su pak uticajni intelektualci različitih političkih orijentacija bili jedinstveni u mišljenju da je nad Srbima već u osamdesetim godinama vršen genocid, onda je jasno da je Milošević u kosovskom pitanju imao ponajviše ulogu katalizatora, što ni malo ne umanjuje, dakako, njegovu odgovornost, ali postavlja današnje dimenzije kosovskog pitanja u realne okvire.

Dvadeset godina kasnije srpska politika je i ozvaničila ideje Dobrice Ćosića i brojnog tabora opozicionih intelektualaca. Došlo je do preplitanja opozicije i zvanične politike. Ćosić je pozdravio Slobodana Miloševića kojeg je uporedio s Nikolom Pašićem, najvećim srpskim političarem 20. veka. Čuveni pisac je 1992. godine, zahvaljujući podršci Miloševićeve partije, postao predsednik Republike, tako je i uspostavljena vlada Ćosić-Panić koja se, međutim, uskoro suočila sa Miloševićevim jastrebima, s obzirom na to da je Milošević bio otelotvorenje antidemokratskog nacionalizma, dok se Ćosić deklarirao kao pristalica demokratskog nacionalizma.

Sledstveno tome parlament je 1993. godine uskratio poverenje Ćosiću i znameniti pisac je od tada sve češće učestvovao na opozicionim skupovima. Kao što je 1968. godine i po pitanju Kosova bio daleko ispred svog vremena, umevši u javnu svest nacionalističku percepciju Kosova, tako je i u konfliktu s Miloševićem 1993. godine, nasuprot vladajućoj političkoj eliti, na vreme shvatio da s Miloševićem srpski nacionalizam srlja u propast.

Nakon sukoba s Miloševićem, sve češće je iznosio mogućnost podele Kosova, ali srpski političari, pa i srpska javnost, kruto su odbijali ovu misao. Ćosić je 21. januara 1992. godine američkom ambasadoru Cimermanu potanko izložio svoj stav da Kosovo treba podeliti i da bi se Srbi zadovoljili s trećinom njegove teritorije. Na taj način je hteo da okonča hladni rat između dve nacije. Prema onome što je

its territory. In this way he wanted to end the cold war between the two nations. According to his diary entry, he suggested the same thing a year before (in 1991) to Borislav Jović, the President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, who in turn sent him to Milošević and he rejected his idea outright.

After the NATO bombing of 1999 and the Kumanovo Accord, Kosovo had been put under protectorate of the United Nations and Serbia had, supposedly for only a while, lost sovereignty over that territory. At the end of 2000 Milošević fell from power – according to some opinions he was betrayed by his own people, the secret police and army, while according to others he was toppled by the angered populace. Politicians then had hoped that with Milošević gone and with a democratically elected government Serbia would regain the sympathies of the world and – sovereignty over Kosovo. But, considering how the Kosovo conflict predates Milošević's politics, this hope quickly faded. In 2002 Zoran Djindjić concluded that it is time to make an energetic move. From Ćosić's diary we know that Prime Minister Djindjić asked him to meet on December 14th 2002 and discuss Koso-

zapisao u svoj dnevnik, godinu dana ranije, dakle, još 1991. godine, isto je predložio i Borislavu Joviću, predsedniku Predsedništva tadašnje Jugoslavije, koji ga je, međutim, uputio kod Miloševića, a ovaj je glatko odbio njegovu ideju.

Kumanovskim sporazumom, nakon NATO bombardovanja 1999. godine, Kosovo je stavljeno pod protektorat Ujedinjenih nacija, Srbija je, navodno privremeno, izgubila suverenitet nad tom teritorijom. Krajem 2000. godine Milošević je pao, prema nekim svedočenjima izdali su ga vlastiti ljudi, tajna policija i vojska, prema drugim mišljenjima, zbrisao ga je gnev naroda. Političari su se ponadali da će Srbija, bez Miloševića, a sa demokratski izabranom vladom, povratiti simpatiju sveta i – suverenitet nad Kosovom. Ali, s obzirom na to da je kosovski konflikt ranijeg datuma od Miloševićeve politike, ova nada se ubrzo raspršila. Zoran Đinđić je 2002. godine procenio da je vreme da povuče energičnije poteze. Iz Ćosićevog dnevnika se vidi da je predsednik vlade 14. decembra 2002. godine pozvao pisca da porazgovaraju o Kosovu. Do prvog susreta došlo je u premijerovom



vo. The first meeting took place in the Prime Minister's apartment since, as he claimed, Ćosić's apartment was bugged. According to the diary entries, Ćosić was pleased that Djindjić showed greater interest for the Serbian national question. That this was not just the writer's subjective impressions we can see from the letters Djindjić sent him in which he says that both of them have similar views.

privatnom stanu, jer kako je rekao, Ćosićev stan je bio ozvučen. Prema tim dnevničkim zapisima Ćosić je bio zadovoljan što je Đinđić pokazao veću zainteresovanost prema srpskom nacionalnom pitanju. A da nije reč samo o piščevim subjektivnim utiscima, pokazuju i priložena pisma Zorana Đinđića, u kojima premijer priznaje da se obojica nalaze na sličnim stanovištima. Obećava, nadalje, da će biti

Furthermore, he promises to be even more radical in his approach to the Kosovo question and that he will thwart Vojvodina's aspirations for greater autonomy. Later, Djindjić sent to Čosić copies of the letters he sent to members of the United Nations Security Council and leading European and US politicians. In letters addressed to Blair and Putin, among others, Djindjić implies the possibility of Kosovo's division. Djindjić was, however, murdered on March 12th 2003. Keeping in mind the previous facts, in his diary Čosić comments, deeply shaken, that Djindjić could have been the politician who would have "saved Serbia from Kosovo".

All of this had taken place a little over seven years ago. At that time this compromise might have been realistic. In the meantime Kosovo has already declared its independence, which has been accepted by many important and influential states. This declaration, according to the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, is not in opposition to international law. In the Security Council itself, Russia's and China's veto had stopped recognition of Kosovo's independence, which could represent a certain symbolic satisfaction for Serbia but this too has its price: distancing from the European Union, which means greater economic crises. At this time then both Serbia and Kosovo are, as in a game of chess, struggling in a "mate" position. The chances that Kosovo could be divided today are smaller than they were seven years ago. In Djindjić's time division seemed like a realistic option, but today it is highly questionable. Time is not working for Serbia. As of recently, some independent international institutions have cautiously been proposing the idea that Kosovo territories with a Serbian majority be given greater autonomy and guaranteed special relations with Serbia. However, neither Serbian nor Kosovo politicians have mentioned this. Maybe this could be the opening for the two sides to meet and find a solution through compromise.

*(Translated from Serbian by
Nina Đurđević-Filipović)*

radikalniji u svom pristupu kosovskom pitanju, i da će skršiti vojvođanska autonomaška stremljenja. Đinđić je kasnije Čosiću poslao i kopije onih pisama koje je uputio članicama Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija, te vodećim evropskim i američkim političarima. U pismima poslatim Bleru i Putinu, pored ostalog, Đinđić nagoveštava i mogućnost podele Kosova. Međutim, Zoran Đinđić je 12. marta 2003. godine ubijen. Imajući u vidu gornje činjenice, Čosić u svom dnevniku, duboko potresen, primećuje da je Đinđić mogao da bude taj političar koji „spašava Srbiju od Kosova“.

Sve se ovo odigralo pre nešto više od sedam godina. Tada bi taj kompromis možda i mogao da bude realan. U međuvremenu je Kosovo proglasilo svoju nezavisnost, koju su priznale mnoge značajne i uticajne države. To proglašenje, prema savetodavnom mišljenju Međunarodnog suda pravde u Hagu nije u suprotnosti s međunarodnim pravom. U Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija veto Rusije i Kine onemogućava priznavanje nezavisnosti Kosova, što za Srbiju može da predstavlja izvesnu simboličnu satisfakciju, ali i to ima svoju cenu: udaljavanje od Evropske unije, a to u praksi znači produblјivanje ekonomske krize. Trenutno, dakle, i Srbija, i Kosovo, koprcaju se u pat-poziciji. Šanse da se Kosovo podeli danas su manje nego što su bile pre sedam godina. U Đinđićevo vreme podela je izgledala kao realna opcija, danas je i to veliko pitanje. Vreme ne ide na ruku Srbiji. Odnedavno nezavisne međunarodne institucije oprezno lansiraju ideju da se kosovskim teritorijama sa pretežnim srpskim stanovništvom obezbedi visok stepen autonomije i da im se garantuju specijalni odnosi sa Srbijom, međutim, o tome ne govore ni srpski, ni kosovski političari. Možda će to biti ona mala vrata na čijem će se pragu dve strane naći kompromisno rešenje.

*(Preveo sa mađarskog
Arpad Vicko)*